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This document presents a safety and performance analysis of the nominal case for the 
In-Trail Procedure (ITP) in a non-radar oceanic/remote airspace. The analysis estimates the 
risk of collision between the aircraft performing the ITP and a reference aircraft.  The risk 
of collision is only estimated for the ITP maneuver and it is based on nominal operating 
conditions. The analysis does not consider human error, communication error conditions, 
or  the  normal  risk  of  flight  present  in  current  operations.  The hazards  associated  with 
human error and communication errors are evaluated in an Operational Hazards Analysis 
presented elsewhere.
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 1 Definitions
Ground Speed Differential. “The speed difference over the ground between the ITP aircraft and the 
Potentially Blocking Aircraft along each aircraft’s track. This measurement would use a technique similar 
to the Doc 4444 – PANS-ATM longitudinal separation procedure using DME (Doc 4444 – PANS-ATM 
section 5.4.2.3) to determine the Ground Speed Differential.” [2] A Positive Ground Speed Differential 
signifies that the ITP Aircraft and the Reference Aircraft are closing on each other (the distance between 
aircraft is being reduced).
ITP  Aircraft. “An  aircraft  that  is  fully  qualified  (from  an  equipment,  operator,  and  flight  crew 
qualification standpoint) to conduct an ITP and whose flight crew is considering a change of flight level.” 
[2]
Potentially Blocking Aircraft. “Aircraft at the Intervening Flight Level whose ADS-B report data are 
available to the ITP aircraft. A Potentially Blocking aircraft that is less than the standard longitudinal 
separation minimum will prevent an aircraft from climbing through the intervening Flight level under 
normal operating conditions (without an ITP procedure).” [2] See Figure 1.
Reference Aircraft. One or two Potentially Blocking Aircraft that meet the ITP criteria and that will be 
identified to ATC by the ITP Aircraft as part of the ITP clearance request.
ADS-B. Automated Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast.
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NUC. Navigation Uncertainty Category [3, 5].
NAC. Navigation Accuracy Category [4, 6].
NIC.  Navigation Integrity Category [4, 6].
SIL. Surveillance Integrity Level [4, 6].
 2 Introduction
The objective of this safety and performance analysis is to evaluate the risk of collision for the proposed 
procedure as a function of the system performance requirements. It is based on a probabilistic event tree 
analysis. The analysis evaluates the soundness of the proposed procedure from the design point of view. 
It estimates the probability of a collision under nominal conditions. Nominal conditions do not include 
human error, communication errors, degradation in engine and airframe performance, etc. The factors 
considered in the analysis are error in surveillance (position and velocity), altitude error, winds, geometry 
and  see  and  avoid  capabilities.  The  calculations  of  collision  risk  do  not  take  into  account  collision 
avoidance equipment on board and other factors discussed in Section 5.1. Therefore, collision avoidance 
equipment such as TCAS and other considerations could further reduce the collision probability.
The analysis performs a parametric study of surveillance accuracy versus collision probability. Given a 
target collision risk, the minimum required surveillance standard can be determined.  An Operational 
Safety Analysis  which includes an Operational Hazards Analysis has been performed for the In-Trail 
Procedure and is reported in [1].
 3 ITP Description
The In-Trail Procedure (ITP) has been developed to  enable aircraft that desire flight level changes in 
oceanic and remote airspace to achieve these changes on a more frequent basis, thus improving flight 
efficiency, comfort, and safety. Under normal non-radar oceanic operations, aircraft typically fly using 
time separation.   The  North  Atlantic  Organized  Track  System (NAT OTS),  for  example,  uses  a  10 
minutes  (time)  separation  at  every  point  along  the  flight  level  track.  This  results  in  a  longitudinal 
separation of approximately 80 nautical miles at 0.83 Mach. 
Figure 1 shows an example of a flight level change request which will be denied in today's operations. In 
this example, the requesting aircraft would like to perform a climb from FL340 to FL360. A blocking 
aircraft at the intervening flight level FL350 is less than the minimum in-track (time) separation and 
prevents the request from being granted.
Figure 1.  Blocking Aircraft Preventing Climb.
This climb will be permitted under the In-Trail Procedure given that the FL360 is open and the requesting 
and blocking aircraft meet the ITP criteria. When a Blocking aircraft is considered qualified for ITP, it is 
called a Reference aircraft. The ITP also permits descents behind a Reference aircraft climbs/descents in 
front of a Reference aircraft,  and climbs/descents between two Reference aircraft.  The definition and 
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detailed description of the In-Trail Procedure including criteria,  procedure phases and flow diagrams, 
communication requirements, roles and responsibilities, operational environment, etc., can be found in 
[2]. A high level summary of the ITP criteria is as follows:
• Initiation range of no less than 15 NM when positive ground speed differential is 20 knots or less
• Initiation range of no less than 20 NM when positive ground speed differential is 30 knots or less
• Requesting (ITP) aircraft capable of 300ft/min minimum climb/descent rate
• Reference aircraft not maneuvering and not expected to maneuver during ITP
• Requested flight level open using current non-ITP separation standards
• Positive (closing) Mach difference between ITP and Reference aircraft of no more than 0.03 Mach.
• Maximum altitude change of 4000 feet
 4 Probabilistic Model (Event) Tree
The risk of collision of an In-trail Procedure is estimated using a probabilistic model tree, Figure 2.
Figure 2. Event Tree for Collision Probability.
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The probability is calculated assuming that the criteria for the ITP are met. Non-normal conditions such 
as an aircraft performing an ITP maneuver when not given a clearance or not being qualified for the 
maneuver are not included in this analysis. A Hazard Analysis has been conducted to cover non-normal 
conditions and is reported in [1].
There are 6 nodes in the tree from which the collision probability is derived.  Node 1 is based on 5 factors 
which are combined to calculate the probability of proximity. Node 4 combines the probability of an 
undetected surveillance error due to failure with winds, altitude and track intercept error. Nodes 2, 3, 5, 
and 6 are event probabilities.
 4.1 Node 1. Probability of ITP aircraft within One Mile Segment of Reference Aircraft
Node 1 estimates the probability that the ITP aircraft crosses a one mile segment of track, which the 
Reference  aircraft  is  occupying,  during  its  climb/descent,  Figure  3.  The  Reference  aircraft  track  is 
arbitrarily divided into 1 mile segments and the probability that the ITP aircraft crosses a segment is 
estimated. This method was chosen to facilitate Monte Carlo simulations. However, as the simulations 
were performed with higher surveillance accuracy,  the number of incidents in which the ITP aircraft 
crossed the Reference aircraft segment decreased to zero. This required larger data samples to be able to 
observe this event. It became evident that very small probabilities will require very large sets of data 
samples which exceeded the time and computational capabilities. Therefore, simulation is not a feasible 
method to calculate these probabilities. 
Figure 3. Reference Aircraft in One Mile Segment.
A probabilistic  analysis  was then developed which uses  the  probability  density  functions  of  the  five 
sources.  The probability  of  the  ITP aircraft  being  inside  the  Reference  aircraft  one  mile  segment  is 
calculated using the five factors: position and velocity surveillance error, altitude error, winds, and track 
intercept error. The calculation follows a probabilistic method for random variables. The variance of each 
distribution is estimated for all the contributing factors. For factors that are the product of two random 
variables, the method described in Appendix B is used. The variance of all the factors is the sum of the 
variances [12]. 
2=P ITP
2 V ITP
2 PRef
2 V Ref
2 2× a1
2  a2
2  a3
2 w
2 trk
2 (1)
where,
PITP and PRef are the standard deviations of the ITP and Reference aircraft position error and are 
given in section 4.1.1,
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V ITP and  V Ref are the standard deviations of the longitudinal error distributions caused by the 
ITP and Reference aircraft  longitudinal  velocity  error and the time to climb/descend.  These standard 
deviations are calculated in section 4.1.1,
 a1 ,  a2 and  a3 are the standard deviations of the longitudinal error distributions for both the 
ITP and Reference aircraft caused by the combination of altitude error and by ground speed, wind, and 
velocity error. These standard deviations are calculated in section 4.1.2,
w is the standard deviation of the longitudinal  error distribution caused by wind and the time to 
climb/descend. This standard deviation is calculated in section 4.1.3,
trk is the standard deviation of the longitudinal error distribution caused by Flight Technical Error 
and   the  relative  angle  between  the  ITP  and  Reference  aircraft  tracks.  This  standard  deviation  is 
calculated is section 4.1.4.
The ITP aircraft is assumed to start the maneuver 15 nautical miles from the Reference aircraft which is 
worst case initiation. The probability of being in the Reference aircraft  one mile segment is then the 
probability  that  the  ITP  aircraft  is  from  14.5  to  15.5  nautical  miles  of  the  starting  position.  This 
probability is given by the difference of the cumulative distribution functions,
F15.5−F14.5 = ∫
−∞
15.5
f  tdt − ∫
−∞
14.5
f  tdt (2)
= 1/21/2 erf  15.5− 2 −1/ 21/2 erf 14.5− 2  (3)
Where f(t) is the probability density function based on the variance of the contributing factors, erf () is the 
error function used to calculate the cumulative distribution function F(x),  σ is the standard deviation of 
the density function which is equal to the positive square root of the variance as given by equation 1, and 
 is the expected value of the distribution.  Some of the calculations were validated using the initial 
Monte  Carlo parametric  simulations.  Table  1 shows probabilities  for  values  of  position  and velocity 
errors  represented  by  the  Navigation  Accuracy  Category,  NAC  (described  in  section  4.1.1).  The 
probability is calculated for both the ITP and Reference aircraft having Navigation Accuracy Category 
for position, NACP, and Navigation Accuracy Category for velocity, NACV, values as shown on the table. 
The top numbers are calculated using equation 3 and the bottom numbers (in parenthesis) are calculated 
using Monte Carlo simulation. The number of samples for the Monte Carlo simulation is limited to 1 x 
1011 due to run time durations. Hence, when the simulation produces zero incidents of ITP inside the one 
mile segment, this is represented in the table as (< 10-11).
NACp NACv
1 2 3 4
1
0.0123 
(0.0124)
0.0118
(0.0119)
0.0118
(0.0118)
0.0118
(0.0118)
2
1.2 x10-4 
(1.2 x10-4)
2.6 x10-5
(2.4 x10-5)
2.2 x10-5
(2.1 x10-5)
2.2 x10-5
(2.3 x 10-5)
3
5.8 x10-8
(9.0 x10-8)
2.0 x10-11
(1.0 x 10-11)
4.7 x10-12 3.9 x10-12
5
NACp NACv
1 2 3 4
4
9.5 x 10-10
(9.9 x10-10)
 1.6 x10-20
(< 10-11)
6.1 x10-23 2.9 x10-23
5
1.1 x10-10
(6.0 x10-11)
4.3 x10-26
(< 10-11)
2.9 x10-30 7.8 x10-31
6 6.6 x10-11
(3.0 x10-11)
1.0 X10-27
(< 10-11)
1.6 x 10-32 3.5 x10-33
7 5.0 x10-11 1.3 x10-28 8.7 x 10-34 1.7 x10-34
8 4.9 x10-11 1.0 x10-28 6.5 x 10-34 1.2 x10-34
9 4.9 x10-11 9.8 x10-29 6.0 x 10-34 1.1 x10-34
10 4.9 x10-11 9.7 x10-29 5.9 x 10-34 1.1 x10-34
11 4.9 x10-11 9.7 x10-29 5.9 x 10-34 1.1 x10-34
Table 1. Probability of ITP Aircraft within One Nautical Mile Segment; Surveillance Accuracy.
The values in Table 1 are for an altitude error of 75 feet (95%), a wind gradient standard deviation of 
16.03 knots, 45 degrees merging tracks, track intercept error with FTE of 2 NM (95%), a positive delta 
Mach of 0.03, 2000 feet altitude difference between the ITP and Reference aircraft, and 300 feet/minute 
climb/descent rate. Table 1 is given for NAC values. For aircraft with ADS-B equipment which transmit 
NUC, the probability of ITP aircraft to the 1 NM segment should be correlated to Table 1. As specified in 
RTCA DO-260A [6], a NUCP value of 5 corresponds to a NACP of 6, NIC of 6 and SIL of 2. Values of 
NUCR and NACV correspond directly to each other. The next sections describe the surveillance error, 
altitude error, wind factor, and track intercept error.
 4.1.1 Surveillance Error
The ITP application uses ADS-B (Automated Dependant Surveillance–Broadcast) to perform the criteria 
check  regarding  range  and  ground  speed  differential.  The  accuracy  and  integrity  of  the  ADS-B 
information broadcast from the Reference aircraft as well as the ITP aircraft own position and velocity 
data will be factors in the collision risk. The accuracy and integrity of ADS-B information are defined in 
the RTCA DO-242, DO-242A, DO260 and DO260A documents [3,4,5,6].  RTCA DO242 and DO260 
documents  quantify  the  surveillance  error  by  means  of  a  Navigation  Uncertainty  Category  (NUC) 
parameter which is broadcast as part of the surveillance data message.  The position and velocity (rate) 
errors  are  characterized  by  NUCP and  NUCR,  respectively.  The  value  for  the  NUC  parameters  are 
obtained from the surveillance equipment which might provide a Horizontal Figure of Merit (HFOM) or 
Horizontal Protection Level (HPL). How the NUC parameters are derived is described in details in the 
RTCA documents.
RTCA DO-242A and DO260A define four parameters: NACP,  NACV, NIC, and SIL. These parameters 
correspond to Navigation Accuracy Category for position and velocity, Navigation Integrity Category, 
and Surveillance Integrity Level. DO260A defines how to interpret messages from equipment which has 
been designed to the DO260 standard. Hence, NAC, NIC, and SIL parameters will be inferred from a 
NUC parameter. DO260A also defines how equipment designed to the DO260 standard interprets NAC, 
NIC, and SIL. Hence, a NUC parameter will be extracted from NAC, NIC, and SIL. The values shown in 
Table 1 give probabilities as a function of NACP and NACV. However, the results can be converted to the 
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NUCP and NUCR parameters using the tables in the next section and the equivalence conversion defined 
in RTCA DO-260A.
Surveillance Position Error
The NUCP and NACP define the horizontal accuracy of the position reported (and vertical for NUC 8, 9 
and NAC 9, 10, 11). Tables 2 and 3 show the 95% horizontal and vertical accuracy bounds for values of 
NUC and NAC, respectively.
NUCP Horizontal  
Error (95%)
Vertical Error  
(95%)
0 Unknown Unknown
1 < 10 NM Barometric Altitude
2 < 5 NM Barometric Altitude
3 < 1 NM Barometric Altitude
4 < 0.5 NM Barometric Altitude
5 < 0.25 NM Barometric Altitude
6 < 0.1 NM Barometric Altitude
7 < 0.05 NM Barometric Altitude
8 < 10 m < 15 m
9 < 3 m < 4 m
10 – 15 TBD TBD
Table 2. Navigation Uncertainty Category for Position (NUCP), Reference [4].
NACP 95% Horizontal and Vertical  
Accuracy Bounds
0 EPU ≥ 18.52 km (10 NM)
1 EPU < 18.83 km (10 NM)
2 EPU < 7.408 km (4 NM)
3 EPU < 3.704 km (2 NM)
4 EPU < 1852 m (1 NM)
5 EPU < 926m (0.5 NM)
6 EPU < 555.6 m (0.3 NM)
7 EPU < 185.2 m (0.1 NM)
8 EPU < 92.6m (0.05 NM)
9 EPU < 30 m and VEPU < 45 m
10 EPU <  10 m and VEPU < 15 m
11 EPU < 3 m and VEPU < 4 m
12 – 15 Reserved
Table 3. Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACP), Reference [6].
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The  Estimated  Position  Uncertainty  (EPU)  is  the  95%  accuracy  bound  on  horizontal  position.  The 
Vertical  Estimated Position Uncertainty  (VEPU) is  the 95% accuracy bound on the vertical  position 
(geometric altitude). The 95% accuracy bounds represents the probability that the aircraft will be within 
the stated bound with a 0.95 probability. This bound corresponds approximately to the 2-sigma deviation 
in a Normal (Gaussian) distribution.  Figure 4 shows the accuracy bound and distribution for the position 
uncertainty. 
Figure 4. Position Uncertainty for 95% Accuracy Bound and Probability Distribution Function.
For example,  an aircraft  reporting a position with a NACP value of 5 will  be within 0.5 NM of the 
reported position 95% of the time. Following a Normal distribution as shown in Figure 4, this aircraft 
reporting a NACP value of 5 will be within 0.75 NM of the reported position 99.7% of the time. The 
standard deviation used in equation 1 is obtained from the Accuracy Bound (the 0.95-quantile),
P ITP = P Ref =
Accuracy Bound
1.96 NM (4)
Surveillance Velocity Vector Error
Velocity error is characterized by the NUCR and NACV parameters. Table 4 shows the horizontal and 
vertical  velocity figures of merit for the NUCR and NACV  value encoding.
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NUCR
NACV
HFOMR value
(95% accuracy)
VFOMR value 
(95% accuracy)
0 HFOMR ≥ 10 m/s or unknown AND VFOMR ≥ 15.24 m/s (50 fps) or unknown
1 HFOMR < 10 m/s AND VFOMR < 15.24 m/s (50 fps)
2 HFOMR < 3 m/s AND VFOMR < 4.57 m/s (15 fps)
3 HFOMR < 1 m/s AND VFOMR < 1.52 m/s (5 fps)
4 HFOMR < 0.3 m/s AND VFOMR < 0.46 m/s (1.5 fps)
Table 4. Navigation Uncertainty and Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity (NUCR, NACV).
The velocity error used in the calculation of collision probability refers to the velocity reported by the 
surveillance equipment on-board. The Mach difference criterion imposed on the procedure is based on 
the assigned Mach numbers given to the ITP and Reference aircraft by the oceanic/remote ATC. The 
collision probability calculation does not take into account the possibility that the aircraft are flying at a 
Mach number other than that assigned by ATC. The standard deviation used in equation 1 is obtained 
from the velocity Accuracy Bound (the 0.95-quantile) and the time to altitude,
V ITP = V Ref =
3600 sec /hour×HFOMR m / s
1.96×1852 m /NM ×talt
NM (4)
where,
talt =
2000 ft
300 ft /min×60 min/ hour hours (5)
 4.1.2 Altitude Error
Altitude error is estimated from standard barometer error models. The altitude error is assumed to follow 
a Normal distribution with plus or minus 75 feet (22.86 meters)  95% of the time. The altitude error 
contributes  to  the  longitudinal  error  by  increasing  or  decreasing  the  time  to  altitude  during  a 
climb/descent.  The altitude error is multiplied by closure rate, wind component, and velocity error to 
obtain longitudinal distance. The standard deviation used in equation 1 for the first component of altitude 
error is,
 a1 =
75 ft
1.96×300 ft /min×60 min /hour×gs NM (6)
where gs is the relative ground speed between the two aircraft. Because  a2 and  a3 are the product 
of  two  random variables,  their  standard  deviations  are  numerically  calculated  using  equation  B1 of 
Appendix B.
 4.1.3 Wind
Two conditions are considered when determining the effect of wind on distance reduction between the 
ITP and Reference aircraft. The first condition is when the relative trajectory angle between the aircraft is 
approximately zero. The second condition is when the relative trajectory angle between the aircraft is 
greater than zero and less than 45 degrees.
Wind, Zero Relative Angle Between Aircraft
The ITP criteria bounds the ground speed difference and Mach number difference between the ITP and 
Reference aircraft. This in turn constrains the wind difference between the ITP and Reference aircraft 
levels.  The ground speed criterion limits the ground speed difference (for 15 NM separation) to 20 knots 
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or less:
vgITP−vgRef ≤ 20 (6)
The Mach criteria limits the Mach difference to 0.03 Mach:
vm ITP−vmRef = Mach ≤ 0.03 (7)
where  vgITP, vgRef,  vmITP and  vmRef are the ground speeds and Mach speeds of the ITP and Reference 
aircraft. Approximating the speed of sound to 576.6 knots1, it is possible to relate the ground speed, Mach 
speed and wind speed:
WFL ITPvmITP×576.6 = vgITP (8)
WFLRefvmITP×576.6 = vgRef (9)
where  WFLITP and  WFLRef are  the  wind  speeds  at  the  ITP  and  Reference  aircraft  flight  levels, 
respectively. Substituting for  vgITP and  vgRef into the ground speed criterion, equation 6, and using the 
Mach criterion, equation 7, yields:
WFL ITP−WFLRefMach×576.6 ≤ 20 knots (10)
Figure 5 shows a graph of possible wind speeds and Mach numbers to satisfy  equation 10, with the plane 
satisfying the equality and the darker shaded volume the inequality.
Figure 5. Wind and Mach Delta to Satisfy Ground Speed and Mach Criteria for Track Angle 0.
1Using International Standard Atmosphere at 35K feet.
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Equation 10 represents  the requirements  for  a climb/descend for separations  of 15 NM or more and 
maximum 20 knots ground speed differential.  The ITP is also defined for a 20 NM separation and a 
maximum of 30 knots ground speed difference. A similar equation must be satisfied for this case.
Figure 6 is a two dimensional view of the wind and Mach conditions to satisfy ground speed and Mach 
criteria. The graph of Figure 6 combines the wind speeds at the ITP and Reference aircraft flight levels 
into a relative wind speed. Conditions on the line and to the left and below the line, depicted by the 
shaded area, satisfy the criteria. 
Figure 6. Relative Wind and Mach Delta to Satisfy Ground Speed and Mach Criteria for 0 Angle.
Winds  and Mach numbers  can contribute  to  reducing  the distance between the ITP aircraft  and the 
Reference aircraft. Because of the ground speed and Mach requirements, the relative wind speed at the 
ITP and Reference aircraft flight levels is limited by equation 10. In addition to the reduction in distance 
permitted by equation 10, there could be additional reduction in distance due to winds between the two 
levels. Whether or not the wind between levels contributes to additional reduction in distance depends on 
the wind profile. Figure 7 shows positive and negative wind gradients on the left and right side of the 
figure, respectively.
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Figure 7. Positive and Negative Wind Gradient Between Flight Levels.
When a positive  wind gradient  is  encountered as the left  example of  Figure 7, the close-in speed is 
limited by the Mach criterion, equation 7. The maximum close-in speed at levels between the ITP aircraft 
and the Reference aircraft will occur at FL(Ref), the Reference aircraft flight level. The maximum close-
in  speed  will  be  17.3  knots2 at  FL(Ref).  Therefore,  the  close-in  speed  will  be  17.3  knots  or  less 
everywhere between FL(ITP) and FL(Ref).  The positive wind gradient case includes the case of zero 
wind gradient.
When a negative wind gradient is encountered as the right example of Figure 7, the close-in speed could 
be limited by the Mach criterion or the ground speed criterion, depending on the magnitude of the wind 
speed  differential.  In  the  worst  case  condition,  the close-in  speed  will  be  no more than 20 knots  at 
FL(ITP) and decreases to no more than 17.3 knots at FL(Ref). 
The positive,  zero,  and negative  wind  gradients  maximum close-in  speeds  apply similarly  to  in-trail 
climbs and descents as well as to lead climbs and descents. For the condition where a maximum of 30 
knots and 20 nautical miles separation is used, similar constraints will occur for positive and negative 
wind gradients. For a positive or zero wind gradient, the close-in speed is limited by the Mach criterion to 
17.3 knots. For a negative wind gradient, the close-in speed could be a maximum of 30 knots at the ITP 
level and decrease to a maximum of 17.3 knots at the Reference aircraft level. 
Figure  8 shows an example  where  the  winds between  levels  further  reduces  the  separation  between 
aircraft. This example produces the greatest  reduction in distance due to winds and Mach numbers.
Figure 8. Wind Gradient Between ITP and Reference Aircraft Levels.
The  chevron  figure  between  levels  depict  the  wind  velocity  gradient.  The  worst  case  scenario  is 
2
 17.3knots is the Mach difference times the speed of sound at altitude; 0.03 x 576.6 knots.
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considered in this example and in the analysis for calculating collision probability. In this example, the 
winds at the ITP and Reference aircraft  levels are such that it  meets the ITP requirement.  The wind 
between levels is such that it contributes to a further reduction of separation as the ITP aircraft performs 
the  maneuver.  The  wind  gradient  magnitude  is  obtained  from observations  of  oceanic  winds  above 
FL260 [7]. The data gathered over a 7 month period considers along-track wind differences between 
2,000 and 4,000 feet vertical separations. 
The case used for the ITP safety analysis is worst case and  extreme in two ways: First, the maximum 
wind differential in the ITP analysis occurs at 1,000 feet vertical separation. Hence, the average wind 
differential magnitudes will likely be less than for 2,000 and 4,000 feet vertical separations in real life 
situations; Second, it is  improbable to encounter wind currents that will be approximately the same at 
levels  2,000  feet  apart  and  significantly  higher  between  the  levels  as  depicted  in  Figure  8.  The 
observations reported in [7] are for wind gradients as shown in Figure 7, in which the wind increases or 
decreases from one level to the other.
The  worst  case  scenario  wind  model,  used  in  the  analysis  and  depicted  in  Figure  8,  will  allow the 
following close-in rates: at the ITP aircraft level, the close-in speed will be a maximum of 20 knots for 
the 15 nautical mile or more and 30 knots for the 20 nautical miles or more range; the close-in speed will 
increase to 20 knots (30 knots) + maximum gradient at the middle of the climb (descent); the close-in 
speed will decrease to a maximum of 17.3 at the Reference aircraft level.  The wind speed distribution 
used for the calculations is a normal distribution with a 16.03 knots standard deviation. The standard 
deviation used in equation 1 for the wind component when the angle is approximately zero is,
w =
16.03
2
×talt NM (11)
where talt is the time to altitude as defined by equation 5.
Wind, Relative Trajectory Angle Between Aircraft Greater than 0 up to 45 degrees.
The  second  condition  considered  for  distance  reduction  due  to  wind  is  the  case  when the  ITP  and 
Reference aircraft have a relative trajectory difference greater than 0 and less than 45 degrees. This case 
considers a wind model in which the magnitude of the wind is the same from the ITP aircraft flight level 
to the Reference aircraft flight level but the direction of the wind changes from the two flight levels. The 
example of Figure 9 shows a wind speed of 120 knots out of the southeast at flight level FL340 changing 
to 120 knots out of the south at FL360. 
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Figure 9. Change in ITP Aircraft Ground Speed due to Wind Direction Difference at Flight Levels.
For this example, the ground speed of the ITP aircraft is 382 knots at FL 340 and 366 knots for the 
Reference aircraft at FL 360. The geometry and conditions satisfy the ITP criteria. When the ITP aircraft 
climbs to the Reference aircraft  flight  level  (FL 360),  its  ground speed increases  to  455 knots.  This 
produces  a  ground  speed  difference  of  89  knots.  This  example  geometry  and  wind  direction  shift 
represents approximately the worst case for the given wind speed. A further wind shift from the east at 
FL340 will allow the reference aircraft to have a higher Mach speed, up to the maximum Mach speed 
differential, producing a ground speed difference of 95 knots. 
Assuming a continuous direction  change between flight  levels,  120 knot  winds,  and 300 feet/minute 
climb rate, the worst case will produce an erosion in distance between the aircraft of 3.2 nautical miles 
for 1000 feet, 6.4 nautical miles for 2000 feet, and 9.6 nautical miles for 3000 feet. That is, for the worst 
case  and  not  considering  any  other  factor,  the  ITP  aircraft  will  cross  5.4  nautical  miles  from  the 
Reference aircraft. 
There is a relatively high probability of a 45 degree wind shift between altitudes for wind speeds in the 
order of 15 to 20 knots. Hourly observations by a Radar Wind Profiler Radio Acoustic Sounding System 
located in Whitewater, Kansas [14] shows wind shift of 45 degrees between 3000 feet altitude in about 1 
in 10 observations.  However, a wind direction shift of 45 degrees with a wind speed magnitude of 120 
knots (example of Figure 9) will cause an along track difference of 85 knots. Reference 7 reports an 
along track difference in the 80 to 85 knots range of only 1 in 28000 observations for 4000 feet altitude 
difference. For an altitude difference of 2000 feet, an along track wind difference of more than 75 knots 
was never observed for 70000 reports.  The probability  density  function of 45 degrees  wind shifts  is 
estimated based on the upper bound imposed by the north Atlantic wind observations.   The standard 
deviation used in equation 1 for the wind component when the angle is larger than zero and less than 45 
is,
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w =
16.03
2
×sin×sin
sin452
×talt
NM (12)
where  is the track angle between the ITP and Reference aircraft,   is the wind shift angle, and 
talt is the time to altitude as defined by equation 5. This equation is only valid for 0≤45o and
0≤45o .
 4.1.4 Track Intercept Error
The initial separation required for initiation of an ITP could be eroded due to track deviation when an ITP 
is performed at converging tracks. Figure 10 shows a top view of merging tracks and the calculation of 
range between the Potentially Blocking aircraft and the ITP aircraft.
Figure 10. Merging Tracks.
The maximum track intercept angle θ to perform an ITP at merging tracks is 45 degrees.  The along track 
range3 between the Reference aircraft and the ITP aircraft is given by:
along track range = DITP−DRef
When the Reference aircraft deviates from its nominal track, an increase or reduction of range will result 
at the merging point. The track of an aircraft is defined by the error model shown in Figure 11.
Figure 11. Track Error Model.
3
 The along track range is called “ITP distance” in the OSED document, reference [2].
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The desired path is the physical track on which the aircraft is expected to fly. The computed path is the 
one calculated by the Flight Management Computer and includes numerical error. Flight Technical Error 
is the ability of the aircraft  to follow the computed path.   The estimated position is the surveillance 
equipment current estimated aircraft location. 
For the ITP initiation distance criterion, the along track range between the ITP and Reference aircraft is 
calculated between the estimated paths of the aircraft and not the desired paths. Therefore, the deviation 
taken into account to calculate track intercept error is the Flight Technical Error. The difference between 
the estimated  and actual  position  is  taken into account  by the  surveillance  error  factor  calculated  in 
Section 4.1.1. The expected Flight Technical Error (FTE) is given in Table 5 and was obtained from 
reference [15]. 
Flight Phase Manual Flight Director Autopilot
Oceanic 2.0 NM 0.50 NM 0.25 NM
En-route 1.0 0.50 0.25
Terminal 1.0 0.50 0.25
Approach 0.50 0.25 0.125
Table 5. Expected Flight Technical Error, 95%.
Reference [15] also shows the results of a study conducted for large and small transport aircraft in which 
the Flight Technical Error was measured. These results are shown in Table 6.
Flight Phase Manual Flight with 
Map Display
LNAV with Flight 
Director Coupled
LNAV with Autopilot  
Coupled
En-route 0.502-0.918 NM 0.111 – 0.232 NM 0.055 – 0.109 NM
Table 6. Measured Flight Technical Error on Small and Large Transport Aircraft.
Although it is expected that an aircraft flying on a remote/oceanic route will have the autopilot engaged, 
the worst case is assumed with a Flight Technical Error under manual flight. A Flight Technical Error 
value of 2 NM (95%) is used for the calculation of track intercept error.
Figure  12 shows the geometrical  variables used in the calculation of separation erosion due to track 
intercept  error.  It  is  assumed that  after  range  calculation,  the  Reference  aircraft  follows the  E track 
instead of the N track. 
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Figure 12. Geometry for Calculation of Distance Erosion due to Track Error.
The Reference aircraft will intercept the merging track at point P1 instead of P0. However, the Reference 
aircraft will arrive at point P1 sooner than it would have arrived at P0 following track N. The Reference 
aircraft will further fly to point P2 before the ITP aircraft reaches the estimated range distance to P0. The 
erosion of separation is the resulting segment S. The value of segment S is given by:
S=EM−N (13)
where
E2=FTE2N22 (14)
N2=N−N1 (15)
N1= FTE
tan 
(16)
M= FTE
sin (17)
and
S=FTE2N− FTEtan 2 FTEsin−N (18)
This geometric equation makes operational sense when the value of N1 does not exceed the value of N 
and when the value of N is not too small compared to the FTE. Figure 13 gives examples for cases when 
N1 is larger than N and FTE is comparable to N.
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Figure 13. Examples of Scenarios where the above Equations should not be Applicable.
In order for the aircraft to be at its maximum FTE deviation, extremely improbable maneuvers would 
have to be performed. In the first example, where N1 > N, the Reference aircraft is at a distance N from 
point P0. It must turn more than 90 degrees to reach point P1. The trajectory is depicted as the dark line 
segments. The second example shows a value N of 3 nautical miles, an FTE of 2 and an angle of 45 
degrees. This example also produces a large angle turn from the nominal trajectory. Since these are not 
probabilistically credible  maneuvers,  the  values of  N,  FTE and  θ are  bounded in the  calculations  of 
separation erosion due to track deviation error. Figures 14, 15, and 16 give values of separation erosion as 
a function of N, FTE and θ, respectively.  For values of N = 30, FTE = 2/1.96, θ = 45 degrees and using 
equation 18, the standard deviation for track error used in equation 1 is,
trk = 0.4406 NM (19)
Figure 14. Separation Erosion as function of Reference Aircraft Distance to Merge Point.
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Figure 15. Separation Erosion as function of FTE.
Figure 16. Separation Erosion as a function of Merge Angle.
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 4.2 Node 4. Undetected Surveillance Failure
RTCA DO260 and DO260A specify how often an ADS-B equipment can transmit data which is outside 
of a containment bound without being detected. This is represented by the Navigation Integrity Category, 
NIC,  and  Surveillance  Integrity  Level,  SIL,  parameters.  ADS-B equipment  designed  to  the  DO-260 
standard will not transmit NIC and SIL parameters. For these equipment, an integrity category will be 
inferred from the NUC parameter. 
The NIC parameter defines the containment bound. The SIL parameter defines the probability that the 
reported position is outside the containment bound due to a surveillance failure and this condition is not 
detected. Tables 7 and 8 give the values of NIC and SIL for containment bounds and probability  of 
exceeding the bounds without detection.
NIC  Containment Radius, Rc, and 
Vertical Protection Limit, VPL
0 Rc ≥ 20 NM
1 Rc < 20 NM
2 Rc < 8 NM
3 Rc < 4 NM
4 Rc < 2 NM
5 Rc < 1 NM
6 Rc < 0.6 NM
7 Rc < 0.2 NM
8 Rc < 0.1 NM
9 Rc < 75 m and VPL < 112 m
10 Rc < 25 m and VPL < 37.5 m
11 Rc < 7.5 m and VPL < 11 m
Table 7. Navigation Integrity Category, NIC, and Protection Bounds.
SIL Probability of Exceeding the Rc Integrity  
Containment Radius Without Detection
0 Unknown
1 1 x 10-3  per flight hour or per operation
2 1 x 10-5  per flight hour or per operation
3 1 x 10-7  per flight hour or per operation
Table 8. Surveillance Integrity Level and Probability of Exceeding the Protection Bound without 
Detection.
 
Node 4 estimates the probability that the ITP aircraft crosses a one mile segment of track which the 
Reference aircraft is occupying when there are undetected surveillance errors due to failure. There are 
four cases to consider when there is a surveillance failure: the surveillance failure is detected and the 
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aircraft position is inside or outside the containment bounds; the surveillance failure is undetected and the 
aircraft position is inside or outside the containment bounds. When the surveillance failure is detected, 
the criteria for ITP will not be met and the procedure shall not be performed. Node 4 considers the last 
two cases: the surveillance failure is undetected and the aircraft  is inside the containment bound; the 
surveillance failure is undetected and the aircraft is outside the containment bound.
Figure  17  shows an  example  that  illustrates  a  distribution  without  failure  and  a  surveillance  failure 
distribution with reported positions inside and outside the containment bound. 
Figure 17. Failure Condition Distribution Example.
The probability that an error goes undetected by integrity monitoring decreases as the reported position 
moves further away from the actual position. The horizontal containment radius is defined as the largest 
distance from the actual location such that the integrity monitoring fails to detect with a probability less 
than or equal to the value represented by SIL. The calculation of Node 4 is performed by setting the mean 
of  the  failure  condition  distribution  over  the  containment  bound with  a  standard  deviation  of  0.255 
nautical  miles.   An  approximation  is  used  for  the  distribution  inside  the  containment  bounds  to  be 
uniform. The case inside the containment bounds is multiplied by the probability of GPS satellite failure 
which  is  conservatively  set  to  10-4 from reference  [16].  The  case  outside  the  containment  bound  is 
multiplied by the probability represented by SIL.
The analysis is similar to that performed for Node 1 and the undetected position error due to failure  is 
one of the factors in determining reduction in distance to the Reference aircraft. The values in Table 9 are 
for an altitude error of 75 feet (95%), a wind gradient  standard deviation of 16.03 knots,  45 degrees 
merging tracks, a track intercept error equivalent to a FTE of 2, a NACV of 2, a positive delta Mach of 
0.03, a 2000 feet altitude difference, and 300 feet/minute climb/descent rate. 
NIC SIL
1 2 3
1 1.1x10-5 4.7x10-7 3.7x10-7
2 4.3x10-8 1.6x10-9 1.2x10-9
3 3.0x10-16 5.8x10-18 2.9x10-18
4 1.5x10-22 2.1x10-24 6.9x10-25
5 3.3x10-26 4.3x10-28 1.0x10-28
6 9.4x10-28 1.2x10-29 2.5x10-30
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NIC SIL
1 2 3
7 2.4x10-29 3.1x10-31 7.6x10-32
8 1.0x10-29 1.4x10-31 4.2x10-32
9 7.6x10-30 1.1x10-31 3.4x10-32
10 7.1x10-30 1.0x10-31 3.3x10-32
11 7.0x10-30 1.0x10-31 3.3x10-32
Table 9. Probability of ITP Aircraft inside One Mile Segment; Undetected Position Error.
 4.3 Node 2. Conditional Collision Trajectory
This node is the probability that the trajectories are collision trajectories, given that the ITP aircraft will 
pass inside the one mile segment of the Reference aircraft. Because of the 0.03 Mach restriction, the 
maximum relative speed between the ITP and Reference aircraft is 17.3 knots when they are at or near 
the  same altitude.  Wind has  an  insignificant  or  no effect  on the  relative  speed  between the aircraft 
because wind gradient is zero (or near zero) at co-altitude. Figure 18 shows possible locations of the ITP 
aircraft with the ITP aircraft climbing and gaining on the Reference aircraft.
Figure 18. Geometry for Collision Trajectory.
The aircraft are modeled by a rectangular box as depicted in the figure. If any part of the box of the ITP 
aircraft falls inside the dashed lines, then the aircraft will be in a collision trajectory.
A vertical speed of 300 ft/minute and a relative horizontal speed of 17.3 knots produces an angle θ of 
 = arctan2.96/17.3 (20)
= 9.72o (21)
The length of the aircraft is represented by l and its height by h. The collision trajectory length is given 
by
ct = lx1x2x3 (22)
where
x1 = h
tan 
(23)
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x2 ≈ h
sin (24)
x3 = l cos − l sin
tan
(25)
The probability of a collision trajectory given a one mile proximity is
Pct∣1NM = ct
1 NM (26)
=
l h
tan

h
sin
l cos− lsin
tan 
1 NM
(27)
As the vertical speed increases, the angle  θ,  equation 20,   increases, and   the angle of attack4 α of the 
aircraft increases. Increasing  θ and α decreases ct and the probability of a collision trajectory, equations 
26 and 27. Also, smaller Mach number differentials will increase the angle θ and reduce the probability 
of a collision trajectory. Therefore, the 300 ft/minute climb and 0.03 Mach closing produce the worst 
probability  of  collision  trajectory.  Higher  climb  rates  and  lower  Mach  closing  speeds  reduce  the 
probability. Using the values 300 ft/minute, 1.0 degree angle α, delta Mach of 0.03, aircraft height h of 
65 feet, aircraft length l of 200 feet, and 6076 feet in one nautical mile,
Pct∣1NM = 943.1/6076 = 0.1552 (28)
A reduction in distance to within the one nautical mile segment of the Reference aircraft will have a large 
horizontal surveillance position error. When a large horizontal longitudinal error is experienced by the 
surveillance equipment, it is very likely that a lateral position error is also present. This lateral position 
error will further reduce the probability of a collision trajectory because the error will cause the aircraft to 
fly offset of its center track. However, the worst case is assumed in which a large longitudinal error exists 
but no lateral error is present. 
 4.4 Node 3. No Appropriate See and Avoid Actions.
A crew operating an aircraft, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight 
rules or visual flight rules,  should perform the function of see and avoid to prevent a collision. This 
requirement is mandated in the USA National Airspace System under Chapter 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, Part 91.113. A flight crew of an aircraft which is in a collision trajectory can successfully 
implement  the  see  and  avoid  functionality  if  it  can  visually  acquire  the  traffic  in  sufficient  time to 
perform an avoidance maneuver. 
There are several factors that affect the probability of visually acquiring a traffic aircraft by the own ship 
(or the own ship being visually acquired by the traffic). The geometry of the encounter is one of such 
factors. Figure 21 in Section 4.6 depict possible geometries for which visual acquisition is not possible. 
A visual acquisition program, Visual 3D, was used to determine the probability that an aircraft, which is 
in a collision course with a traffic aircraft, will see the traffic in sufficient time to avoid a collision [8,9]. 
The time required to avoid a collision after visually acquiring a target has been estimated to be on the 
order of 12 seconds [10]. The visual acquisition program uses the following parameters to estimate the 
probability of seeing the traffic:
4
 The angle of attack of an aircraft is the angle between the aircraft's horizontal axis and the horizontal plane. The 
angle of attack of an aircraft and its climb rate are proportional. Is is assumed that an aircraft with a 300 ft/min 
climb rate will have approximately a 1 degree angle of attack.
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Type of aircraft, traffic
True air speed, own
True air speed, traffic
Crossing angle
Climb rate, own
Climb rate, traffic
Visual range
Resolution limit
Field of view, H up
Field of view, H down
Field of view, left
Field of view, right
Search, pilot 1
Search, pilot 2
Beta 0, search effectiveness
Beta 1, search effectiveness
Tau 1, beta transition, time
Tau 2, Pacq, time
D1, beta transition, range
D2, Pacq, range
The probability of visually acquiring the traffic aircraft during an ITP maneuver with a 10 NM visual 
range is estimated to be near one for the geometry conditions described in Section 4.3.  Figure 19 shows 
an aircraft at approximately 1 NM and 1000 feet above the own ship (photo courtesy of Rick Shay).
Figure 19. Aircraft on Track alpha of North Atlantic Track System.
At a closing rate of 17.3 knots and a distance of 1NM, it will take 208 seconds before a collision results.  
This will  greatly exceed the 12 second collision avoidance time.  The other critical  factor  in visually 
avoiding a mid air collision is weather conditions. The probability of having IMC or VMC is obtained 
from [11] and it is 0.2 and 0.8, respectively. The dominant factor in visually acquiring or not acquiring 
the traffic, for the ITP geometries and speeds, is the weather conditions. Therefore, it is assumed that in 
good visibility the crew will be able to see and avoid the traffic with probability 1 and in bad visibility it 
will see and avoid with probability 0. Node 3 is given the value 0.2 for no see and avoid.
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 4.5 Node 5. Geometry for Undetected Surveillance Error.
Values of NIC of 2 or greater produces containment bounds of less than 8 nautical miles. The geometries 
are similar to that of Node 2. The minimum climb rate and maximum Mach closing rate are used as the 
worst case parameters. The value for Node 5 under these assumptions is 0.1552.
For values of NIC of 1 or zero the undetected surveillance error could produce geometries in which the 
Reference aircraft could be behind, above or in front of the ITP aircraft. The collision trajectory could be 
a positive relative speed, a negative relative speed, or a zero relative speed.  The positive relative speed 
between the ITP aircraft and the Reference aircraft produces a geometry as depicted in Figure 18. A 
negative relative speed will have a geometry similar to that of Figure 18, but with the Reference aircraft 
trailing the ITP aircraft. However, since there are no limits to the negative relative Mach number between 
the aircraft, the angle could be smaller than that calculated in Section 4.3. Figure 20 shows an example in 
which the Reference aircraft's position has a large longitudinal error and its actual location is behind  the 
ITP aircraft instead of ahead as reported by the surveillance equipment. 
Figure 20.  Geometry for Undetected Surveillance Error.
A negative relative Mach number of 0.10 is used for the calculation of probability of collision trajectory 
for a geometry as illustrated in Figure 20. This is a rather large speed difference for aircraft flying in the 
oceanic environment at approximately the same altitude. 
 = arctan 2.960.1×576.6  (29)
= 2.94o (30)
The collision trajectory length is given by
ct = lx1x2x3 (31)
where
x1 = h
tan 
(32)
x2 = l cos  (33)
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x3 ≈
hlsin
tan 
(34)
and 
h, l are the height and length of the aircraft.
The probability of a collision trajectory given a one mile proximity is
Pct∣1NM = ct
1 NM (35)
=
l h
tan
l cos hlsin 
tan 
1 NM
(36)
Using the values 300 ft/minute,  1.0 degree angle  α,  delta Mach of 0.10, aircraft height  h of 65 feet, 
aircraft length l of 200 feet, and 6076 feet in one nautical mile,
Pct∣1NM = 2999.2/6076 = 0.4936 (37)
The probability  of  a  collision trajectory  given ITP aircraft  within  one mile  segment  will  depend on 
whether the Reference aircraft is in front of the ITP aircraft or trailing the ITP aircraft. The value 0.1552 
is used when the Reference aircraft is in front of the ITP aircraft as calculated in Section 4.3. The value 
0.4936 is used when the Reference aircraft is trailing the ITP aircraft as calculated in this section. The 
probability of the Reference aircraft leading or trailing the ITP aircraft is dependent on the values of NIC 
and SIL. Therefore, The collision trajectory probability is weighed with the values of NIC and SIL to 
obtain collision trajectory probability. For the case NIC = 1, the Reference aircraft has a 15/29 probability 
of trailing the ITP and 14/29 of leading the ITP aircraft. For this value of NIC,
Pct∣1NM = 0.4936 x15/ 290.1552 x14/29 = 0.3302 (38)
 4.6 Node 6. No Appropriate See and Avoid Actions.
Visual acquisition for undetected position error depends on the geometry of the encounter. In contrast to 
the geometry of visual acquisition for Node 3, an undetected position error could have the ITP aircraft 
below (or above),  the reference aircraft.  The most severe case for visual acquisition is when the ITP 
aircraft is immediately below (or above) the Reference aircraft with near zero relative horizontal velocity. 
In this case, neither the ITP nor the Reference aircraft will see each other before a collision. Although a 
zero relative velocity is the worst scenario when the aircraft are horizontally co-located, zero relative 
velocity will produce extremely low probabilities of getting close to the Reference aircraft for Node 1 and 
Node 4.
The  three  geometry  conditions  are  considered  in  calculating  probability  of  no  visual  for  a  uniform 
distribution. The vertical field of regard of a commercial passenger aircraft is approximately -75 degrees 
to 60 degrees as measured from the horizontal [8]. Aircraft encounters in which the relative trajectory of 
the aircraft is outside these limits will result in no visual acquisition, Figure 21.
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Figure 21. Range for No Visual due to Geometry.
The length for the No Visual range is:
NoVisual range = l FLN1−FL N
tan 

FL N1−FLN
tan 
(39)
where l is the length of the aircraft and φ and ψ are the field of regard from the cockpit. 
A flight level difference of 1000 feet gives a No Visual range of 1022 feet.  A 2000 feet flight level 
difference give a No Visual range of 1844 feet. The probability of No Visual is then the probability of the 
ITP aircraft in the no visual range or IMC conditions:
Node 6, No Visual = 1844 /60760.2−1844/6076 x0.2 (40)
= 0.4428 (41)
Because the probabilities of nodes 1,4 and 6 are interdependent, the value calculated above will be used 
when a near zero relative horizontal velocity is used. When other relative velocities are used, the value 
calculated for Node 3 will be used.
 4.7 Other Considerations Not Included in the Collision Probability Calculations
There are other considerations that have not been used in the calculation of collision probability. All of 
these considerations, as discussed below, further reduce the collision probability. These include:
1. Track offset
2. Track offset due to error
3. On-board collision avoidance systems
4. Error data latency
5. Common mode error
Track offset is the procedure of flying 0, 1, or 2 nautical miles offset from the center of the track. This 
procedure not  only reduces the collision probability during an ITP maneuver but also during regular 
operations. When using track offset in the calculation of collision probability, the probability will be 1/3 
that of operations without track offset. 
An aircraft reporting a location which has a significant deviation from its actual location will likely be 
navigating with a comparable error off of its intended track. The larger the positional error, the more 
likely that it will be off of its track. This track offset due to error will reduce the probability of collision 
when an aircraft is preforming an ITP.
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On-board collision avoidance systems such as TCAS II will further reduce the collision probability by 
providing traffic and resolution advisories. An on-board collision avoidance system will have a greater 
impact during IMC and conditions where the geometry prevents visual acquisition. 
Data error latency can also have an impact on the probability of collision. The ITP requires that the flight 
crew assesses the distance and relative ground speed between the aircraft before a request is made and 
again before  initiating the maneuver.  A large surveillance error  which is  undetected  by the integrity 
monitoring equipment might be detected during the ITP criteria reassessment if the duration of the error 
is less than the request, clearance, and reassessment time. 
Common  mode  error  will  reduce  the  contribution  of  position  and  velocity  surveillance  error  to  the 
collision probability. When the ITP and Reference aircraft are receiving surveillance data from the same 
source such as GNSS/GPS, bias errors will likely affect both aircraft and the relative position error will 
be minimized.
 5 Results Summary and Conclusion
 5.1 Results Summary
The probability of collision due to an In-Trail Procedure is calculated taking into account several factors. 
These factors are shown in the probability tree of Figure 2. The two branches of the tree can be calculated 
assuming different parameters of NAC, NIC, and SIL. 
Selecting the values NACP = 6, NACV = 2, NIC = 5, SIL = 2, track intercept of 45 degrees, FTE 2 NM, 
delta Mach = 0.03, 2000 feet altitude difference, and 300 ft/min climb/descent rate produces the collision 
probability as shown in the tree of Figure 22. These values of NAC, NIC and SIL correspond to a NUCP 
value of 5 and NUCR value of 2. Note that Nodes 1-6 will have different values if different parameters of 
accuracy, integrity, track angle, FTE, delta Mach, vertical difference and climb rate are chosen. 
Figure 22. Representative Collision Probability for parameter values of NACP = 6, NACV = 2, 
NIC = 5, SIL = 2, 45 Degrees Track Intercept with FTE 2 NM, 2000 feet altitude difference, and 
300 feet/minute climb/descent rate.
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A target level of safety (TLS) in a per-flight-hour basis can be determined by estimating the average 
number of In-Trail Procedures which will be performed in a typical flight and normalizing for a per-flight 
-hour basis. The method is defined in reference [13]. The probability of collision can be reduced to meet 
the desired target level of safety by imposing more stringent requirements on the surveillance equipment 
and/or tighter ITP requirements. Also, requirements could be relaxed if more relaxed requirements can 
meet the TLS. 
 5.2 Conclusion
The nominal procedure for ITP is inherently safe with regard to collision risk. For the parameters shown 
in Figure 22, the collision risk is estimated at 4.47 x 10 -29 per ITP operation for the nominal non-failure 
condition. A hazard assessment must be performed to determine if the ITP procedure meets the Target 
Level of Safety in the presence of failures and operational errors. A target level of safety of 5 x 10-9 fatal 
accidents per dimension per flight hour is specified by ICAO as stated in reference [17]. This target level 
of safety must be met when considering all contributing factors for Air Traffic Services, not just ITP. 
Depending on the allocation of safety to hazards, the target level of safety for the ITP might be achieved 
even when relaxing some of the criteria. This is shown in Appendix A. For example, a positive delta 
Mach number of 0.07 and 3000 feet altitude difference will meet a nominal non-failure case collision risk 
objective of 1 x 10-9.
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Appendix A
This appendix contains comparisons of collision probabilities for different values of delta Mach numbers 
and altitude differences between ITP and Reference aircraft. The results are presented first, followed by 
the analysis for each node. Nodes 3 and 6 do not change for Mach and altitude differences. 
The Mach initiation criterion requires that the ITP and Reference aircraft have a bounded positive delta 
Mach.  That  is,  the closure  rate  of  the  two aircraft  due to  their  Mach speed is  limited by the  Mach 
criterion. Table A.1 shows the probability of collision for the ITP maneuver as a function of delta Mach 
and altitude difference for  NACP = 6, NACV = 2, NIC = 5, SIL = 2, track intercept of 45 degrees, FTE 2 
NM, and 300 ft/min climb/descent rate.
P(collision) Delta Mach
0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10
2000  feet  altitude 
difference
4.47 x 10-29 7.32 x 10-27 3.45 x 10-24 2.75 x 10-19
3000  feet  altitude 
difference
9.89 x 10-14 4.35 x 10-12 2.79 x 10-10 1.9 x 10-8
Table A.1. Probability of Collision for Positive Delta Mach.
Node 1
The probability of passing inside the Reference aircraft one mile segment is calculated for different delta 
Mach numbers and altitude difference for NACP = 6, NACV = 2, NIC = 5, SIL = 2, track intercept of 45 
degrees, FTE 2 NM, and 300 ft/min climb/descent rate. 
Probability  of  one 
mile segment
Delta Mach
0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10
2000  feet  altitude 
difference
1.01 x 10-27 1.36 x 10-25 4.21 x 10-23 2.62 x 10-19
3000  feet  altitude 
difference
3.18 x 10-12 8.06 x 10-11 3.99 x 10-9 2.02 x 10-7
Table A.2. Probability of ITP inside One Mile Segment; Surveillance Accuracy.
Node 2
A vertical speed of 300 ft/minute and a relative horizontal speed of 28.83 knots (Mach 0.05 at 35K feet) 
produces an angle θ of 
 = arctan2.96/28.83 (A 1)
= 5.86o (A 2)
A vertical speed of 300 ft/minute and a relative horizontal speed of 40.36 knots (Mach 0.07 at 35K feet) 
produces an angle θ of 
 = arctan2.96/40.36 (A 3)
= 4.19o (A 4)
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A vertical speed of 300 ft/minute and a relative horizontal speed of 57.66 knots (Mach 0.1 at 35K feet) 
produces an angle θ of 
 = arctan2.96/57.66 (A 5)
= 2.94o (A 6)
The collision trajectory length is given by
ct = lx1x2x3 (A 7)
where
x1 = h
tan 
(A 8)
x2 ≈ h
sin (A 9)
x3 = l cos − l sin
tan
(A 10)
and 
h, l are the height and length of the aircraft.
The probability of a collision trajectory given a one mile proximity is
Pct∣1NM = ct
1 NM (A 11)
=
l h
tan

h
sin
l cos− lsin
tan 
1 NM
(A 12)
Using the values 300 ft/minute, α of 1.0 degree, aircraft height h of 65 feet, aircraft length l of 200 feet, 
delta Mach numbers of 0.05, 0.07, and 0.1, and 6076 feet per nautical mile,
Pct∣1NM∣0.05 = 1635.9 /6076 = 0.2692 (A 13)
Pct∣1NM∣0.07 = 2129.2/6076 = 0.3504 (A 14)
Pct∣1NM∣0.10 = 2864.9/6076 = 0.4715 (A 15)
Node 4
Probability of passing inside the Reference aircraft one mile segment using undetected surveillance error 
due to failure as a factor. The probability  is calculated for different delta Mach numbers and altitude 
difference for NACP = 6, NACV = 2, NIC = 5, SIL = 2, track intercept of 45 degrees, FTE 2 NM, and 300 
ft/min climb/descent rate. 
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Probability  of  one 
mile  segment  for 
undetected  error 
due to failure
Delta Mach
0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10
2000  feet  altitude 
difference
4.31 x 10-28 3.28 x 10-26 7.22 x 10-24 1.33 x 10-20
3000  feet  altitude 
difference
6.13 x 10-15 1.19 x 10-13 1.60 x 10-12 1.38 x 10-10
Table A.2. Probability of ITP inside One Mile Segment; Undetected Surveillance Error.
Node 5
The collision trajectory probability for undetected surveillance error due to failure is calculated following 
the method in Section 4.2. For the delta Mach numbers 0.05, 0.07 and 0.10,
Pct∣1NM∣0.05 = 0.4936×15/290.2692×14/ 29 = 0.3853 (A 16)
Pct∣1NM∣0.07 = 0.4936×15/290.3504×14/ 29 = 0.4245 (A 17)
Pct∣1NM∣0.10 = 0.4936×15/290.4715×14/ 29 = 0.4829 (A 18)
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Appendix B
Calculation of the variance of the product of two random variables
There are terms in the calculation of reduction-in-distance that are the product of two normally 
distributed random variables. The terms are:
(altitude error/climb rate) x (wind)
(altitude error/climb rate) x (velocity error)
To account for these factors, the variances of their distributions are needed. The variances can be 
calculated from the probability density functions. However, a closed form of the probability density 
function of the product of  two random variables is infeasible [1]. Therefore, the variance of the 
distribution is numerically calculated using the formula,
s
2 =
∑
i=1
n
xi
2−
∑i=1
n
xi
2
n
n−1
(B 1)
where s2 is the variance, xi is a sample or outcome, and  n  is the number of samples.
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